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The Tennessee Rule Against
Perpetuities: A Proposal for Statutory
Reform
C. Dent Bostick*
For several decades, there has been agitation for reform of the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. For the most part, the re-
formers have urged that improvements in the Rule and the manner
of its application be accomplished through legislative enactment.'
Only a few jurisdictions have opted for reform by the judiciary. 2
Thus far, there has been no legislative reform of the Rule in Tennes-
see; the appellate courts of the state continue to apply the Rule in
its common-law form with all the confusing rubrics attached to it
by centuries of development. The condition of Tennessee's law on
the subject contrasts sharply with that of neighboring Kentucky
where significant reform has been achieved. 3 Considering the poten-
tial for serious mischief and even catastrophic consequences in prop-
erty and estate transactions when the common-law rule is applied,
it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at the Rule and its applica-
tion in Tennessee.
It is the purpose of this article to review the development of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, the policies it undertakes to advance, the
peculiar problems which have evolved in the centuries of its devel-
opment, the Tennessee experience in applying the concept, and the
possible legislative or judicial avenues to a more efficient applica-
tion of the Rule and its underlying policies.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; B.A. 1952, J.D., 1958 Mercer
University.
1. Several states have made statutory changes. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.3-715.7 (West
Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 191-96 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.215-23
(1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101-06 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 11-102 to -
103 .(1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, §§ 1-2 (1955); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs §§ 9-1.1 to 9-1.8 (McKinney 1967); OHmo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2131.08-09 (Page 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 6104-6105 (Spec. Pamph. 1974); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1291b (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-03 (1967); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 11.98.010-.050 (1967); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (Spec. Pamph. 1974); REV.
STAT. OF ONTARIO ch. 343 (1970); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964; Western Austra-
lian Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities and Succession) Act, 1962; Perpetuities Act, No. 47
(New Zealand 1964).
2. See, Smith Perpetuities in New Jersey: A Plea for Judicial Supremacy, 24 RUT. L.
REV. 80 (1969).
3. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.215-.223 (1973). See also Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpe-
tuities Law Restatement and Reformed, 49 KY. L.J. 3 (1960).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON-LAw RULE
The origin of the Rule Against Perpetuities lies deep in the
history of English land law. As a result, there can be no real under-
standing of the Rule and its policy without some reference to this
history. This requirement in itself presents difficulty to the nonhis-
torian because of the enormous intricacy of twelfth through nine-
teenth century English property arrangements. An enduring theme
permeates the evolution of English property law, however, and con-
tinual reference to that theme makes the law's development more
plausible, orderly, and understandable. The overriding theme is
that from the earliest Norman times English land law always em-
bodied a conflict between those who, for varying reasons, wanted
land freely alienable and available for commerce, and those
landowning gentry who wanted it preserved in family lines for sup-
port of future generations.4 In the course of this long conflict, the
common-law courts allied themselves with the proponents of free
alienability and through their decisions evolved a highly pragmatic
property law that provided for the free availability of property for
conveyance. On the other side of the struggle, the landowners were
assisted by legislation from a Parliament they long dominated, and
by the magnificent talents of a conveyancing bar, who with great
imagination and improvisation, successfully countered each move of
the courts to undo the shackles that the bar had placed on free
alienability of land. The similarity of the work and goals of these
ancient conveyancers when compared with modern estate planners
is striking and obvious. It is interesting to note that the tools with
which today's planners work, the "estates" in land, are the direct
descendants of the conveyancers' tools in medieval and renaissance
England.
The concept of "estates" in land was becoming established in
English law by the early fourteenth century. It is a concept of owner-
ship measured in terms of time, and while probably an inheritance
from the continent, it reached its peculiar fullness in Anglo-
American law. Basically, the concept recognizes the possibility of
successive ownership of the same piece of land by dividing the own-
ership into "estates," each of which can have a present existence,
although only one can have a present right to possession.5 Those
estates having a present existence but no present right of possession
are termed "future interests;" it is these interests which, from an-
4. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 56-58 (1955).
5. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 10 (2d ed. 1898).
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cient times, have attracted the attention of those who have wanted
to direct the disposition of property beyond their lifetimes. From the
manipulation of the future interest has come the enduring policy
debate of the proper balance between the right of the "dead hand"
to control property past its lifetime and the right of each generation
in turn to enjoy it as it wishes.
It was this concept of future estates that gave rise to the prob-
lem governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. Prior to the Statute
of Uses,' there was only one serious source of potential trouble
among the future interests allowed by the law. That troublemaker
was the remainder, and more specifically, the contingent remainder.
A remainder is defined as a future interest created in a transferee,
which can become a present possessory estate only on expiration of
a prior estate created by the same instrument in favor of another
transferee.8 Its creation was a highly technical affair and to be effec-
tive, every element in its description was essential. A remainder
that was not subject to a condition precedent, and was limited to a
person in existence and ascertained was said to be a "vested" re-
mainder. This variety of remainder was recognized as early as the
thirteenth century and was the first future interest creatable in
someone other than the grantor of the estate or his heirs. The vested
remainder is, by definition, not an undue restraint on free alienabil-
ity of property because it can be limited only to persons now in
existence or ascertainable, thus precluding its use as an instrument
to convey property to unborn, unknown future generations.
The close kin of the vested remainder is the contingent remain-
der; here a different and more serious problem is confronted by
those wishing to curtail perpetuities. The contingent remainder,
recognized somewhat later than the vested remainder,9 is defined as
a remainder subject to a condition precedent or limited to a person
not ascertained, or not in existence. Obviously, if one owning an
estate could pass it by contingent remainders to persons yet unborn
or unascertained at critical times, one could hold property in a
family line indefinitely without fear that the property could be al-
6. Ironically, modern English law permits only the fee simple absolute and the term of
years absolute as legal estates; all other estates in property are equitable in England. Such
is not the case in this country where, for the most part, the possibility of creating all the old
estates in law or equity still survives. Three acts passed in 1925 played a major role in bringing
this result about; Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20 (1925); Settled Land Act, 15 Geo. 5,
c. 18 (1925); Trustee Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19 (1925).
7. Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1536).
8. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 110 (1962).
9. For a discussion of the historical development of remainders, see T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 560-64 (5th ed. 1956).
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ienated in fee simple by the life tenant by simply conveying a re-
mainder to the oldest son in each successive generation in his family
forever. The great landowners had something along this line in mind
when in 1285 they pushed through Parliament the Statute De Donis,
which created the famous, and now nearly extinct, "fee tail" es-
tate.'0 The fee tail was a new estate in land of limited inheritance
and imposed a restraint on alienation outside the line of lineal de-
scent. Simply by conveying land to the grantee "and the heirs of his
body" the grantor could insure that the land would remain in the
lineal chain as long as there were bodily heirs in each successive
generation. It took the common-law judges almost two hundred
years to bring this device under control, but the free alienability
advocates finally countered the fee tail estate with a collusive and
fictitious lawsuit called the common recovery." The landowners
eventually regrouped and recovered some ground in the develop-
ment of the "strict settlement"'' 2 arrangement in the seventeenth
century, but the usefulness of fee tail as a totally reliable tool was
at an end with the appearance of the common recovery lawsuit.
Similarly, the courts acted to control the contingent remainder dan-
ger. By the sixteenth century, the courts had developed the "des-
tructibility of contingent remainders" rule,'3 which provided that a
contingent remainder that did not vest on or before the expiration
of the supporting freehold estate was destroyed. By this relatively
uncomplicated but effective response, the courts had rendered im-
potent, as an instrument of long term control of property, the only
contingent interest then creatable in a third party transferee.
The struggle continued with Parliament's enactment of the
famous Statute of Uses" in 1536 which, among its other dramatic
10. De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285).
11. By sanctioning this highly legalistic device in Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, 19
pl. 25 (1472), the courts provided a method whereby the tenant in tail in possession could
bar the entail by bringing a fictitious and collusive lawsuit, the result of which was to convert
the fee tail into a fee simple. See L. SimEs & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF Fb-ruaa INTERESTS § 14
(2d ed. 1956).
12. The "strict settlement" was a complex series of legal transactions whereby the
English gentry were generally able to maintain land in the family through successive genera-
tions by pushing forward a basic resettlement centering on fee tail and primogeniture one
generation at a time. The arrangement was no longer possible after the English reforms of
1925. See G. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 136 (4th ed. 1964).
13. This destructibility rule was established by a series of cases which included Anon.,
2 Leo. 224, 74 Eng. Rep. 497 (K.B. 1577); Brent's Case, 2 Leo. 14, 74 Eng. Rep. 319 (K.B.
1583); Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B. 1589); Archer's Case,
1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597); Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 103, 79 Eng. Rep. 691
(K.B. 1628). As to the status of the rule in the U.S. today see 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
673-77 (1967).
14. See note 7 supra.
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impacts on the history of land law, made possible the creation by
conveyance of two new estates in land, the springing executory in-
terest and the shifting executory interest. The Statute of Wills in
1540 made possible the same two estates through testamentary de-
vise. 5 The springing interest always cut short an estate in the gran-
tor and caused the title to "spring" forward to a new taker. For
example, if grantor conveyed to grantee "from and after twenty-five
years from the date of this conveyance," the state of the title imme-
diately after the conveyance would be: fee simple absolute in gran-
tor subject to a springing executory interest in grantee, grantee's
estate becoming possessory twenty-five years from the date of the
conveyance by cutting short grantor's fee simple; or if the convey-
ance was from grantor to A for life, one day thereafter to B in fee
simple, the state of the title immediately after the conveyance
would be: life estate in A, reversion in fee simple in the grantor for
one day, springing executory interest in B, which would cut short
the grantor's fee reversion after one day and cause the fee to spring
forward to B.
The shifting executory interest, on the other hand, always cut
short an estate in another transferee, rather than the estate of the
grantor, and shifted that estate to a second transferee. For example,
if the grantor conveyed to B in fee simple, but if B married X, then
to Y in fee simple, the state of the title immediately after the trans-
fer would be fee simple in B subject to shifting executory interest
in Y. If in fact, B married X, the fee would be cut short and trans-
ferred to Y.
Each of the new interests was relatively simple to create and
each could be used to closely approximate the same estate as had
previously been possible only through contingent remainders."6 For
a time, it was believed that the new interests were subject to the
same destructibility rule as were contingent remainders. In the case
of Pells v. Brown, 7 however, the English courts ruled that the des-
tructibility rule did not apply to executory interests, at least to the
extent that the executory interest was not destructible by any action
of the owner of the preceding estate. The effect of the Pells ruling
15. Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VHi, c. 1 (1540).
16. For example, before the statute, if A wanted to create a life estate in B followed by
a contingent interest in C, he could create such an interest in C only by the use of a contingent
remainder, which was of course subject to all the hazards surrounding a contingent remain-
der. After the statute, A could convey to B for life, and one day thereafter a contingent
interest in C. C's interest now is a springing executory interest not subject to the dangers of
destructibility, etc.
17. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620).
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was somewhat dampened half a century later by the holding that
any interest which at the time it was created could take effect either
as a contingent remainder or as an executory interest must take
effect as a contingent remainder and, therefore, be subject to the
destructibility rule.'" Nevertheless, there now existed a viable
vehicle for creating new contingent future interests with no effective
method of limiting the time in which they must vest or fail. The
lawyers of the landowning gentry began to utilize the new advantage
by creating long term leases with executory interests, an arrange-
ment not subject to defeat by the common recovery. This develop-
ment required counter measures from the free alienation side of the
dispute. Thus came the Rule.
The Rule Against Perpetuities is, of course, a court-made rule.
It did not develop into the proposition we know today until the
nineteenth century.9 Its origins derive from the famous Duke of
Norfolk's case decided in 1682.21 In the middle of the seventeenth
century, the Earl of Arundel's family situation presented a problem
to his solicitor, Sir Orlando Bridgman, an ingenious master of the
intricacies of common-law conveyancing. The Earl wished to leave
a certain estate, the Barony of Grostock, to his second son, Henry.
But if Henry's older brother Thomas died (which was expected since
he was an invalid) leaving the title of Earl and the bulk of Arundel's
estates to Henry, then the Earl wanted Grostock to go to his younger
son Charles. Bridgman set to work and produced an arrangement
whereby, among many other complicated provisions, Grostock was
given to Henry for a long term of years upon the executory limitation
that if Thomas died while Henry was still alive (as happened), then
Grostock would go to Charles. Earl Arundel died, Thomas became
Earl and died, and Henry became Earl and later Duke of Norfolk.
He refused to give up Grostock to Charles on the ground that
Charles' interest was void as a perpetuity. The case was a fascinat-
ing one much caught up in the politics of the times. The arrange-
ment, however, was ultimately sustained by the House of Lords in
Lord Nottingham's ruling that if a future interest must vest, if at
all, during or at the end of a life in being, it is not void as a perpetu-
ity. From this beginning, the English courts struggled for two centu-
ries with both the permissible period of the Rule and its nature. In
18. Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Lev. 39, 83 Eng. Rep. 443 (K.B. 1669).
19. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1832-33). A strong
argument against reform of the rule by the courts alone is found in the observation that it
took from 1682 (the Duke of Norfolk's case) to 1832 (the Cadell case) for the courts to state
the rule in its common law form.
20. Howard v. Duke of Norfolk, 2 Chan. Rep. 230, 21 Eng. Rep. 665 (1682).
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1832, the period of the Rule was finally established as lives in being
and twenty-one years following and any needed period of gestation.',
By 1886, John Chipman Gray depicted the nature of the Rule as one
against remoteness of vesting and not one of suspension of aliena-
tion. As finally set out by Gray, the Rule accepted in England and
America is:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty one years after some life in being at the creation of theinterest.''2
THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON-LAW RuLE
On its face, Gray's statement of the Rule seems direct, to the
point, and well adapted to its role as the principal judicial weapon
in controlling the operation of the dead hand on the transmission
of wealth. In fact, as applied by the courts, it has become a "techni-
cality ridden nightmare" to the draftsmen undertaking to meet its
requirements. 23 To fully understand the policies underlying contem-
porary efforts at reform of the common-law rule, one must grasp the
limitations and troubles of the common-law rule and especially the
peculiar set of presumptions and constructions that through the
years attached to it.
1. Interest to which the Rule Applies
The common-law rule applies to both real estate and personal
property, as well as to both legal and equitable interests. Because
it is not a rule about interests that last too long (in theory a fee
simple absolute can last forever) but a rule about vesting, it gener-
ally applies only to nonvested interests. 24
Possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry are not regarded
as subject to the Rule despite the fact that they are in theory contin-
gent interests.2 The possibility of reverter is that future interest
retained in the grantor and his heirs which follows either a fee sim-
ple determinable, or the now virtually defunct fee simple condi-
tional.2 The right of re-entry is the future interest retained in the
21. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1832-33).
22. J. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
23. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1349 (1954).
24. A good discussion of all interests subject to the Rule may be found in J. GRAY, supra
note 22, §§ 279-330.3.
25. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1238-39 (2d ed. 1956).
26. Three states still retain the fee simple conditional, Iowa, Oregon and South Caro-
lina, but it is only of importance in South Carolina. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 195 (1966).
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grantor and his heirs following a fee simple on condition subsequent.
Although the historical reason is unclear, both interests enjoy ex-
emption from the Rule, probably because they evolved long before
the Rule itself and because their availability was believed to encour-
age gifts to charity, a policy consideration as important as avoiding
perpetuities. These interests have in some cases received special
statutory attention,27 but for the most part, they endure unchecked
to clutter land titles.
The two categories of future interests left as subject to the Rule
are contingent remainders and executory interests. Even as to these
estates one must consider technical exceptions. For example, al-
though executory interests are always contingent in theory and thus
subject to the Rule, an interest limited on an executory interest that
is certain to occur should be regarded as vested and therefore not
subject to the Rule in every instance."8 It is not certain, however,
that this construction would prevail. Further, there is the "all or
nothing" concept, later discussed, which renders contingent-for
purposes of application of the Rule-those class interests vested
subject to partial divestment. 2 Options to purchase land not inci-
dent to a lease are regarded as contingent interests and subject to
the Rule 0 Certain charitable distributions are not subject to the
Rule. 31
The requirement of the Rule is that the subject interest must
"vest" within the period of the Rule. This does not necessarily mean
a vesting in possession-though as to executory interests there can
be no vesting until they become possessory-rather, it means a vest-
ing "in interest." There is a requirement that the interest be abso-
lutely certain to vest, if it is ever going to vest, within the period of
the Rule.32
27. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18 (1969);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (Smith-Hurd 1969); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.218-19, 222-23
(1973); LA. REv. STAT. § 9.2321-22 (1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 103 (1964); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 3 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (1945); NEB. REV. STAT. 99 76-
299 to 76-2.105 (1971); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 345 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS § 1951-55 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34.4-19 (1969).
28. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hammerstein, 380 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1964); 4 RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 370, comments g and h (1944).
29. The leading English case is Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363 (1817). The important
Tennessee case dealing with the issue is Crockett v. Scott, 199 Tenn. 90, 284 S.W.2d 289
(1955); see 5 R. POWELL, supra note 13, §§ 780-87; 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 25,
§ 1265, at 197; 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 371, 383 (1944).
30. J. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 230.1, 330.1; 3 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 25,
99 1243-44.
31. See 3 L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 25, §§ 1278-87.
32. L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 127, at 265 (2d ed. 1966).
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2. The Permissible Period
The permissible period includes lives in being plus the period
of gestation-if there is an actual gestation involved-and a gross
period of twenty-one years following. The twenty-one year period
must follow the lives, it cannot precede them.3 The "lives" involved
must be human lives, not the lives of an artificial person or the lives
of animals, 34 but they need not be lives associated in any way with
the beneficiary nor need they, themselves, receive any beneficial
interest under the disposition.3 5 The measuring lives may be explic-
itly designated in the instrument," or they may be implied from
the terms of the gift.37 There is no limit to the number of lives chosen
as measuring lives so long as it is reasonably possible to ascertain
their identity.3 8
3. The Requirement of Certainty of Vesting
Professor Gray advanced the notion that one should ascertain
what interests were created by an instrument and then remorse-
lessly apply the Rule to these interests as created.39 Thus, one views
the problem from the effective date of the interest's creation, that
is, the delivery date in case of a deed and the date of testator's death
in case of a will.40 If measured from that time, an interest subject
to the Rule might not vest within the period of the Rule, that inter-
est is void. Probabilities that an interest will or will not in fact vest
within the permissible period are irrelevant. If there is any
possibility that the interest will not vest, it is void.4 It is from this
proposition-the required absolute certainty of vesting as viewed
from the time of creation-that most of the problems in application
of the common-law rule have flowed.
33. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, comment o (1964); L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra
note 25, at § 1225; Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638, 640-42 (1938).
34. In re Howells' Estate, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932). As to the lives
of animals see In re Kelly, [1932] Ir. R. 255. As to corporations see Fitchie v. Brown, 211
U.S. 321 (1908). As to both see 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, comment h (1944).
35. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399 Ill. 320, 77 N.E.2d 675 (1948); In re
Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 A. 123, 125 (1933).
36. As for example, the royal lives clause, see In re Villar, [1929] 1 ch. 243.
37. Harris v. France, 33 Tenn. App. 333, 355-58, 232 S.W.2d 64, 73-74 (1950); 4
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, commentj (1944).
38. Thellusson v. Woodford, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805); J. GRAY, supra note 22, at
H9 216-18; 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, comment a (1944).
39. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 629.
40. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 13, at § 764(2); 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, com-
ment b (1944); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 31, at § 1226.
41. In re Freeman's Estate, 195 Kan. 190, 404 P.2d 222 (1965).
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In determining whether an interest is certain to vest within the
period of the Rule as viewed from the time of its creation, the com-
mon-law courts developed a set of four corollary rules which have
come to be characterized as:
1. The "fertile octogenarian" rule. 2
2. The "all or nothing" rule.13
3. The "slothful executor" or "administrative contin-
gency" rule.44
4. The "unborn widow" rule.45
On applicable factors, each of these rules may be used to void a gift
on an extremely remote, and sometimes even physically impossible,
sequence of events. For example, the fertile octogenarian rule in-
volves the conclusive presumption that a female can bear children
at any age despite any physical handicap, even a total hysterec-
tomy." By this rule, a gift by testator to all of his sister's grandchil-
dren is void under the rule even if the evidence is that at the effec-
tive date of the gift, testator's death, the sister is eighty years of age
and has had a total hysterectomy. The classic theory is that the
sister might yet bear another child who in turn might produce an-
other grandchild after the sister's death. Since the measuring life,
the sister's new child, would not be a life in being at the critical
time, the gift is void. In addition, under the all or nothing rule, the
gift to all of the sister's grandchildren is void, not merely the gift to
the later born grandchild. This result is required by the accepted
construction that while a gift to a class may be vested subject to
partial divestment, nevertheless, such a gift is considered "contin-
gent" as to all until "vested" as to all for purposes of applying the
Rule Against Perpetuities.17
The unborn widow rule may become operative when contingent
interests are created that vest on the death of a person described
only by status such as "widow" or "husband." The danger is that
such person's life is the measuring life, and if the "widow" was not
a life in being, or might not have been a life in being at the creation
42. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 377 (1944).
43. Id. § 371, comments a and d.
44. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 13, at § 764(5).
45. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 370, comment k (1944).
46. The existence of this ancient presumption is recognized in In re Lattouf's Will, 87
N.J. Super. 137, 208 A.2d 411 (1965). That court, however, refused to apply the presumption
when the evidence indicated that the female in question had undergone a total hysterectomy
rendering her permanently sterile. The court suggested that to so apply the presumption
would "blind us to present realities and conceal demonstrable truth." Id. at 415. See also 4
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 377 (1944).
47. See note 28 supra.
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of the interest, the interest is void. Hence, in a devise to A for life,
then to A's widow for life, then to such of their children who survive
A's widow, the gift to the children is void since it is contingent on
the termination of a life not necessarily in being at T's death. A
could have married a woman not yet born at T's death. The fact
that A dies married to the woman to whom he was married for forty
years before T's death does not change the result. It is the potential,
not the actual, violation that is decisive. Finally, the administrative
contingency or slothful executor rule voids interests that are contin-
gent on some event not tied to lives in being." While one may
properly have a contingency on a twenty-one year gross period not
tied to lives, the event must be certain to occur within the gross
period. Hence a gift to one to be vested "immediately after the
probate of my will" is void since there is no absolute certainty that
the testament will be probated within twenty-one years of the testa-
tor's death.
THE TENNESSEE EXPERIENCE
The Tennessee appellate courts have consistently claimed
strict adherence to the traditional common-law rule.49 Yet the frus-
tration of its application appears early in the state's history as ex-
emplified by the Supreme Court's appraisal of the matter in 1853:
This rule [against perpetuities] was adopted upon sound considerations
of policy, to unfetter estates for the promotion of commerce, and has been
firmly maintained for centuries .... These rules are too familiar to require a
reference to authorities to sustain them. But the books are crowded with con-
troversies arising out of their application, and much apparent, if not real
conflict, exists in the reported cases and elementary writers on the subject.
[Emphasis added]'"
Until the decade of the 1950's, the Tennessee appellate courts
consistently applied the common-law rule with the accepted classic
common-law constructions.' The Tennessee Courts state the Rule
thusly: "that executory limitations, whether of real or personal es-
tate in order to be valid, must vest in interest, if at all, within a life
or lives in being and twenty-one years and a fraction thereafter, or
the terms of gestation in cases of posthumous birth."52 It is recog-
nized in Tennessee that the Rule is not a rule of construction but a
mandate of law whose object is to defeat intent, not to test it.53 It is
48. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 13, § 764(5).
49. Lewis v. Claiborne, 13 Tenn. 369 (1821).
50. Bramlet v. Bates, 33 Tenn. 373, 385 (1853).
51. See generally Warner, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 TENN. L. REv. 641 (1951).
52. Hassell v. Sims, 176 Tenn. 318, 324, 141 S.W.2d 472, 475 (1940).
53. Marks v. Southern Trust Co., 203 Tenn. 200, 310 S.W.2d 435 (1958).
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recognized that the Rule is not one dealing with the length of legal
or equitable estates.5
In the 1888 case of Brown v. Brown,5 5 the court recognized the
necessity for viewing matters as they might conceivably transpire at
the effective date of the will and without regard to what subse-
quently did occur." In the later case of Frank v. Frank," the court
recognized the Rule's conclusive presumption of lifelong fertility in
perpetuities cases by holding that, for purposes of the Rule, sixty-
four and fifty-eight year old women were capable of bearing chil-
dren.58 In Crockett v. Scott,59 the court recognized the fertility pre-
sumption and applied the "all or nothing" rule to a class gift where
it appeared that some of the class were in life when the gift was
made but that others might come into life at a later time not within
the period of the Rule." In Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Allen,6'
the court voided an executory interest which was to become posses-
sory on an event unrelated to any life and which might not occur
within the twenty-one year gross period, thereby again correctly
applying the Rule in its common-law form."2 All of these cases indi-
cate Tennessee's adherence to its stated policy of following the
common-law rule.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, however, the Tennessee
Supreme Court premised several decisions on unfortunate reasoning
resulting in considerable confusion concerning the law of perpetui-
ties. Apparently the court was not consciously seeking to modify
principles concerning previous application of the Rule; yet, it mis-
applied the Rule according to its own previously announced stan-
dards. A particularly confusing decision is the 1956 decision of
Sands v. Flys in which the court struggled with the question
whether certain remainders over after the expiration of successive
life estates violated the Rule and hence were void. The troublesome
remainders, given to certain nAmed nieces and nephews of the testa-
tor, were to take possession at the death of the last surviving child
of the testator's son. The son was in life at the testator's death. In
a confusing analysis, the court appeared properly to hold that the
54. Tramell v. Tramell, 162 Tenn. 1, 35 S.W.2d 574 (1930).
55. 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S.W. 869 (1888).
56. Id. at 291, 6 S.W. at 873.
57. 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1926).
58. Id. at 218, 280 S.W. at 1013.
59. 199 Tenn. 90, 284 S.W.2d 289 (1955).
60. Id. at 103, 284 S.W.2d at 295.
61. 221 Tenn. 90, 424 S.W.2d 796 (1967).
62. Id. at 97-98, 424 S.W.2d 799-800.
63. 200 Tenn. 414, 292 S.W.2d 706 (1956).
1164 [Vol. 27
TENNESSEE PERPETUITIES RULE
Rule was not violated if the remainders to the nieces and nephews
were gifts to persons living at testator's death and were vested in
interest at the time of testator's death even though possession was
delayed until the death of testator's last son. 4 This is, of course, a
correct analysis since if the interests are vested from inception,
there is nothing on which the Rule can operate. The court concluded
that the remainders were so vested. Without apparent necessity,
however, the court suggested that the Rule was not violated because
the interests must vest within the lives of testator's son's children
and that all these persons were in life at testator's death. This
finding, of course, ignores the common-law presumption that testa-
tor's son could have children at any time until his death. If the
interests created here had been found contingent, and if in fact they
could not vest until the termination of a potential measuring life not
in being at testator's death (namely his unborn grandchild), then
the Rule was violated by common-law standards. The court did not
appear to recognize the presumption of continuing fertility and
thereby confused the nature of the common-law rule and its appli-
cation. In actuality, all the remaindermen were named and were in
being at testator's death so that their interests, if contingent, had
to vest within their own lives if at all and thus could not violate the
Rule. This factor should have decided the case because the court
had already determined that the interests were not vested from the
time of their creation and hence not subject to the Rule. The gratui-
tous and erroneous analysis following that finding was unnecessary.
In the 1958 case of Marks v. Southern Trust Co.,5 the Supreme
Court again departed from the basic concepts of the Rule. The case
involved construction of an irrevocable inter vivos trust naming as
successive life beneficiaries the settlor, the settlor's named son and
his named wife and the survivor of them, and then the children of
the named son and his named wife surviving their mother and fa-
ther. The court correctly decided that the class of children included
a child born to the son and his wife after the execution of the instru-
ment since the gift to children was intended as a class gift, but then,
perplexingly, it went on to suggest that if a clause limiting the
duration of the trust itself to named lives in being and twenty-one
years had not been included, the gift to the after born child would
have rendered the class gift violative of the Rule."8 This conclusion
is erroneous as the class in question consisted of the children of a
64. Id. at 425-26, 292 S.W.2d at 712.
65. 203 Tenn. 200, 310 S.W.2d 435 (1958).
66. Id. at 211-12, 310 S.W.2d at 440.
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person who was himself a life in being at the time of the creation of
the trust and, hence, any child of his-whenever born-would have
to be born within the life of a life in being at the creation of the trust.
Further, the court confused the existence of the trust itself with the
existence of the interests created within the trust. There is no re-
quirement that a trust duration be limited to the Rule period; the
requirement is that interests within the trust vest within the rule
period. Thus, in Marks the court again evidenced a lack of under-
standing of the basic principles of the Rule.
In the 1960 case of Ross 6. Stiff, 7 the Supreme Court again
considered a perpetuities problem and rendered a dubious decision.
In that case, the court construed a holographic will in which the
testator placed his estate in trust with the direction that the income
was to be divided into certain percentages and paid variously to his
widow, children and as an educational fund for his grandchildren.
At the death of testator's grandchildren there were gifts over to their
issue, if any, and other contingent gifts if they had no issue. Cor-
rectly, the court concluded that the gifts of the remainder interests
to great-grandchildren and contingent takers were void. Unfortun-
ately, however, the court also concluded that the gifts of income to
the grandchildren of testator as an educational fund were also void
since the possible delay till the education of the grandchildren
might result in the gift not vesting within the period of the Rule.68
The court could easily have held that the interests of the grandchil-
dren vested in interest within the Rule, because all the grandchil-
dren would of necessity have been in life at the end of a life in being
at testator's death, namely, his own children's lives. The fact that
the trust for the grandchildren might then have continued on past
the time of the Rule is unimportant since the critical interests would
have vested in the grandchildren during the period of the Rule. Once
again the court seems to have confused the vesting of an interest
within a trust with the duration of the trust itself.
In sum, the general Tennessee experience has been one of cor-
rect application of orthodox thinking on the Rule. None of the cases
cited seem to have intentionally departed from the basic policy of a
common-law application and when an application deviates from
that policy, it resulted from a basic misunderstanding of the
common-law rule and not an attempt to intentionally depart from
the precepts of the Rule.
67. 47 Tenn. App. 355, 338 S.W.2d 244 (1960).
68. Id. at 374, 338 S.W.2d at 252-53.
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THE NEED TO REFORM
There is need for reform of the Rule in Tennessee and those
other jurisdictions following the common law. Perhaps some of the
hesitance in reform efforts comes from the notion that the earliest
attempt at statutory enactment-that of New York in 1830 69-was
a disaster and that New York's subsequent efforts have been de-
signed to overcome the defects of the original tampering with the
common-law rule .7 Yet, effective methods seem available and the
need is clear for the following reasons.
1. The principle reason for reform is that the Rule has become
so complex in its application that the overwhelming body of those
who must deal with it in practice simply do not understand its
operation sufficiently well to meet its demands. Rather than serve
a valuable social purpose in keeping the right to dispose of property
largely in the present generation, the Rule has become a snare to
the draftsman who unknowingly crosses its path. Perhaps the prac-
ticing bar can take some comfort in the California case exonerating
an attorney of negligence for drafting a violation of the Rule on the
ground that the Rule has literally become too complicated to under-
stand.7'
2. The Tennessee cases discussed above demonstrate that the
court appeared to misunderstand and misapply the Rule72 even
under its own previously announced standards.
3. The common-law rule, as applied, leads to the unreasona-
ble result of voiding interests that subsequently do vest within lives
in being and twenty-one years. The reason is that under the ortho-
dox view, the interests created must be viewed from the date of
creation and if there is any possibility, however remote, that they
will not vest within the stipulated period, they are void. This "re-
morseless" application of the rule thus voids many interests that are
unobjectionable in light of the rule's social policy.
4. The common-law rule is not sufficiently inclusive of all
objectionable contingent interests. In particular, the Rule has no
application to a possibility of reverter or right of reentry. Yet, these
ancient devices serve a dubious purpose today and in fact contribute
69. For statutes pertaining to real property see N.Y. REV. STAT. Pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art.
1, §§ 14-24; art. 2, § 63; art. 3, §§ 81-85, 128 (1830). For statutes pertaining to personal
property see N.Y. REv. STAT. Pt. 2, ch. 4, tit. 4, §§ 1-2 (1830).
70. See Pasley, The 1960 Amendments to the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and
Powers of Appointment, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 679 (1960).
71. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591-93, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826,
re'g 11 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
72. See cases cited notes 57-59 supra.
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to the clogging of title chains and uncertainty about marketability.
Any effort at reform should include control of these two future inter-
ests. With these concerns as a backdrop, and with subsequent ex-
planation, the following provisions are offered as a reformation of
the Rule in Tennessee:
PROPOSED STATUTES
1. In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest
in real or personal property limited to take effect at or after the
termination of one or more life estates in, or lives of, persons in
being when the period of said rule commences to run, the valid-
ity of the interest shall be determined on the basis of facts exist-
ing at the termination of such one or more life estates or lives.
In this section an interest which must terminate not later than
the death of one or more persons is a "life estate" even though
it may terminate at an earlier time. Any interest which would
violate said rule as thus modified shall be reformed, within lim-
its of that rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the
creator of the interest.
2(a) A fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in
land subject to a right of entry for condition broken shall become
a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur
within thirty years from the effective date of the instrument
creating such fee simple determinable or fee subject to a right
of entry. If such contingency occurs within said thirty years the
succeeding interest shall become possessory or the right of entry
exercisable notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities. This
section shall not apply to rights created prior to
1974. (Effective date of the statute).
2(b) Every possibility of reverter and right of entry created
prior to , 1974, (Effective date of the statute) shall
cease to be valid or enforceable at the expiration of thirty years
after the effective date of the instrument creating it unless be-
fore , 198_, (Seven years from the effective date of
the statute), a declaration of intention to preserve it is filed for
record with the Registrar of Deeds of the County in which the
real property is located.
To best comprehend the precise rationale underlying this pro-
posed statute, it is first necessary to understand the reform experi-
ence in other states.
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HISTORY OF REFORM POSSIBILrrIEs
The most effective and widespread effort at legislative reform
in modem times has been through the adoption of the so-called
"Wait and see" doctrine.73 This doctrine utilizes the period of the
common-law rule but judges the validity of an interest by actual,
not potential events. Therefore, an interest is valid under the "Wait
and see" doctrine if it, in fact, vests within the period of the Rule,
even though, when viewed from its creation could conceivably not
vest within the period of the Rule. This doctrine was first advanced
by statute in Pennsylvania in 194711 with subsequent enaction in
Vermont and Kentucky. 75 All of these jurisdictions allow the com-
plete period of the Rule to run for "wait and see" purposes. The
operation of the doctrine can be simply illustrated: Assume a gift
from a testator to all of the grandchildren of B. Applying the
common-law rule, the gift to the grandchildren is void if B is alive
at testator's death. The reason is that it is conceivable that as
viewed from testator's death, B could have a child subsequent to
testator's death which child could in turn produce a grandchild of
B. That grandchild's interest then might not vest within lives in
being plus twenty-one years of testator's death. This would be the
case if at testator's death B has no child, but later produces a
grandchild, then such grandchild's interest does not vest within the
period of the Rule. But it is conceivable and perhaps even probable
that the outlined sequence of events will not actually occur. The
"Wait and see" doctrine would wait and see whether or not all of
the grandchildren of B were in life within the period of the rule. If
this was the case, the gift to the grandchildren of B would be valid.
This solution seems eminently sensible and preferable to the ortho-
dox common law approach.
There are, however, some serious objections to the "wait and
see" approach. The very requirement that one wait and see if inter-
ests do in fact vest within the period of the Rule itself renders
property effectively inalienable during the waiting period. If the
policy of the Rule is to render the maximum amount of property as
freely alienable as possible, that policy has been somewhat undercut
by the time one must wait to see. If it were not for the waiting
73. Popularity of the reform concept received new impetus from an article by Professor
Leach advocating change: Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 HAv. L. REv. 721 (1952).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).
75. Ky. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967);
accord, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 1 (1955); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Page 1968).
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period, presumably the Rule would be violated, the interests so
created declared void, and the title rendered certain from the date
of creation. The English reform78 mitigates this objection considera-
bly by requiring that the disposition shall be treated as if it were
not subject to the Rule against perpetuities until such time as it
becomes established that vesting will occur beyond the period of the
Rule. For example, until such time, payments made by trustees
under the disposition are valid.
The waiting period also creates a problem in terms of the mea-
suring lives. Under the common-law rule, one had to determine at
the time of creation whether vesting would occur within any life in
being at that time. This rule required contemporary reference to
either stipulated lives in the instrument, or to lives implied by rea-
son of their casual relationship to determine whether the interest
would vest or fail. Under wait and see, it is open to question whether
this standard is still present, or whether the courts may pick any
life that happens to be in existence at the time the interest was
created and use that life to save an interest even though the life
selected has no casual reference to the interest's validity, either by
stipulation or implication, and is selected only for its longevity. If
the latter holds true, obviously many more provisions will be held
up and some on unreasonably long limitations.
The reformers have been of two views on the problem of mea-
suring lives under the "Wait and see" doctrine. Pennsylvania and
Vermont in this country and Western Australia, abroad, have re-
tained the common-law standard.77 At the other extreme, the Eng-
lish Perpetuities Act of 19648 developed an extremely intricate and
complex method of specifying the measuring lives in a wait and see
rule application. Somewhat between these two approaches, the
Kentucky and Ontario 9 statutes require that a measuring life be
relevant to or in some way limit the period in which the interest may
vest. Thus, the argument over measuring lives under wait and see
comes to this: One view contends that measuring lives under wait
and see is no different than measuring lives under the common-law
rule since in each instance it is necessarily implied that the measur-
ing life must have some casual relation to the matter of vesting; the
other point of view is that in adopting wait and see legislation, the
76. The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 3. See 25 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 6 (3d ed. 1970).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (Spec. Pamph. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501
(1967); Western Australia Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities and Succession) Act, 1962.
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1973); REv. STAT. OF ONTARIO ch. 343, § 6 (1970).
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legislature must define measuring lives to avoid the possibility that
courts, in order to save the interest, will select the most ancient life
available irrespective of whether that life had any relationship at all
to the vesting of the interest in question. Experience thus far sug-
gests that an elaborate attempt at definition as in the English stat-
ute may be unclear and unwieldy."0 Further, a modified legislative
expression on the subject, as in Kentucky or Ontario, is of uncertain
value since both are sufficiently imprecise to require judicial inter-
pretation of each definition of the measuring life. Perhaps the best
approach is to eliminate any reference to the determination of mea-
suring lives in the statute and to rely simply on the courts to apply
the wait and see concept in a sensible way, effecting its design of
modifying the more unreasonable rigors of the common law while
not creating a new problem in stretching the wait and see period
beyond any reasonable standard of social benefit. The matter is
unsettled and remains a source of disagreement among the perpetu-
ities reformers .8 . A second major technique for reform is utilized
in the proposed Tennessee statute. This is the so-called "modified
wait and see" legislation, originally developed in Massachusetts
under the influence of Professors Leach and Casner at Harvard, and
since adopted in Connecticut, Maine and Maryland.82 Unlike the
Pennsylvania "wait and see" statute that permits a waiting for the
entire period of the Rule to see what actually occurs, the modified
wait and see approach applies only where there are gifts over at the
ends of life estates created in persons who are lives in being at the
effective date of the instrument. This concept permits waiting only
until the end of the life estates to ascertain the validity of the inter-
est. There is merit to this approach; since the corpus of the estate
cannot be distributed until the intervening life estates terminate,
there seems no inconvenience in waiting until that time to deter-
mine the validity of the ultimate distributions of the corpus.
A third major technique of reform, used independently or in
conjunction with the wait and see approach, is the cy pres or judicial
reformation technique. The final sentence of Section I of the pro-
posed statute incorporates this technique. This device is a statutory
authorization allowing a court to reform a disposition, when neces-
80. 0. BROWDER, L. WAGGONER & R. WELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SErTLEMENTS, FUTURE
INTERESTS 714 (2d ed. 1973).
81. See Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV. 486 (1964) and the
reply to this article, Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being, 81 L.Q. REV. 106 (1965).
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 11-103 (1969).
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sary, so as to bring it within the permissible period of the Rule while
carrying out the ascertained general intent of the donor. The most
obvious example is a gift by a testator to those of his grandchildren
who reach age twenty-five. If survivorship to age twenty-five is re-
quired of the grandchildren for the interest to vest, then the Rule is
violated since this event is not certain to occur within lives in being
and twenty-one years of testator's death. If the court can reduce the
survival requirement to age twenty-one, however, the Rule is not
violated since all of testator's children must be in life at his death
and all the grandchildren must reach age twenty-one within twenty-
one years after the last child's death. Presumably, the testator
would prefer this result to one of a totally void gift. The problem
with this solution is that, unrestricted, it confers extraordinary dis-
cretion on the court to rewrite the testator's will. The Vermont and
Kentucky statutes meet this criticism, in part, by combining "wait
and see" with cy pres. The court's right to reform is limited to the
time when the "Wait and see" rule has run its course and it has
become apparent that the interests will not vest within the period
of the Rule.83 Other jurisdictions permit cy pres solutions only in
specific problem areas, such as the reduction of an age contingency.
While these provisions may curtail considerably the discretion of
the court in rewriting the will (often the interest will vest within
"wait and see" and no reform is necessary), one of the principal
benefits of the cy pres technique is lost in the combination ap-
proach. A strength of cy pres not enjoyed by wait and see is that cy
pres can reform the disposition at once without the necessity of the
long period of uncertainty characteristic of the "wait and see" ap-
proach. To the extent that reform can be applied only after wait and
see has intervened, this advantage is lost. Some states have chosen,
therefore, to provide for reform without the wait and see delay re-
quirement.84 As a technique for reform of the rule, cy pres seems to
hinge on how much the courts are to be trusted in its application.
If the necessarily broad discretion leads the courts to tortured dispo-
sitions not in accordance with the pattern intended by donors, the
technique will fail. On the other hand, if the courts use the doctrine
sparingly, carrying out the scheme of the donor as reasonably as
possible, the technique has many advantages.
A third possibility of reform (not incorporated in the proposed
statute) that can be used with "wait and see" or cy pres statutes is
the gross period of years provision, containing an optional perpetu-
83. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967).
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Supp. 1974).
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ity period within which an interest must vest. The English Perpetui-
ties and Accumulations Act of 1964 provides that the perpetuity
period may, if desired, be a duration equal to a gross term of years,
not exceeding eighty, as is specified in the instrument itself.85 This
was said to be an attempt on the part of the Law Reform Committee
in England to attract draftsmen away from the so called "royal
lives" clause under which it is often difficult to ascertain the ident-
ity and status of all the relevant lives.86 California has adopted a
similar provision limiting the gross period to sixty, rather than
eighty, years. The simplicity of this alternative is attractive, espe-
cially where there is a conscious desire to restrict the time of vesting
for long periods and hence the ultimate disposition of property.
Finally, there have been discussions on reform which involve a
change in the concept of the Rule from one of remoteness of vesting
in interest, to a concept requiring a vesting in "possession."88 If the
societal purpose served by the Rule is one of preventing a long term
tie up of property, this discussion deserves considerable attention.
Property is effectively controlled by some long term "vested" inter-
ests that may not become possessory until long beyond the period
of the Rule. The principal concern in converting the Rule from one
requiring "vesting in interest" to one requiring "vesting in posses-
sion" is that this process, in itself, would make the Rule much more
rigid and inflexible than it is presently.
APPLICATION TO TENNESSEE
Tennessee today is in a position to take advantage of the experi-
ence in reform acquired since the initial Pennsylvania statute of
1947. There seems to be little doubt that the common-law rule ought
to be modified in some fashion to produce a more workable formula
that would balance the rights of property owners to direct the dispo-
sition of their property and the societal interest in limiting those
rights. Tennessee, then, has the opportunity to consider an unquali-
fied "wait and see" approach; a modified "wait and see;" a "wait
and see," (modified or not) combined with judicial cy pres provi-
sions; or cy pres without the "wait and see" intervention. Any of
these techniques may be combined with an alternative gross period
provision of the English or California variety. As examined above,
85. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 1.
86. 25 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 3 gen. note (3d ed. 1970).
87. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.6 (West Supp. 1974).
88. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? in LEGIsLAToRS'
HANDBOOK ON PERPETUITIES 31 (ABA 1958).
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serious objections have developed to both the unlimited "wait and
see" and the unlimited cy pres reforms; in the former case the prin-
cipal objections are the long period of uncertainty and the difficulty
in identifying measuring lives; in the latter case the objection re-
lates to the possibility of judicial abuse of an essentially uncon-
trolled power to rewrite the instrument. Given these concerns and
the evolving judicial treatment of them, a less ambitious departure
from common law principals would appear prudent. Specifically, it
seems a sensible course for Tennessee to adopt a modified "wait and
see" provision along the following lines.
Where interests are created to take effect at or after the end of
one or more life estates or at the end of some life in being at the time
the interest is created, the validity of the interest should be deter-
mined on the basis of facts existing at the end of the life estate or
lives and not on facts existing at the time the interest is created.
This proposal has a two-fold advantage. There is no severe problem
as to the selection of measuring lives. Further, the waiting period is
cut down either to the duration of intervening life estates when the
corpus is not distributable anyway, or to other lives in being at the
time the interest is created on which distribution hinges but which
are not necessarily income beneficiaries under life estates. Together
with the adoption of such a "wait and see" doctrine, the legislature
should enact either separate reform measures specifically directed
at those evils which have become traps for the draftsman and serve
no reasonable purpose or should enact a statute providing the broad
cy pres or reform power to remedy the same problems. Should the
legislature issue separate statutes addressing specific problems,
then:
1. There should be a statute permitting courts to reduce an
age contingency in order to bring the conveyance into conformity
with the Rule;
2. There should be a statute denying the presumption that a
person is capable of having children at any stage of adult life, and
therefore permitting the introduction of evidence whether a person
is or is not capable of child bearing at the time in issue;
3. There should be a statute providing that in determining the
validity of future interests for perpetuity purposes, a person de-
scribed as the "spouse" of a person in being at the time the estate
is created shall be conclusively presumed to be a "life in being" at
the time the interest is created for purposes of applying the Rule;
4. There should be a statute providing that where the vesting
of an interest is made to occur on a specified contingency not related
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to the existence of a life in being-as for example on the probate of
a will-the presumed intent of the creator of the interest is that the
contingency would occur, if at all, within twenty-one years from the
effective date of the instrument;
5. There should be legislation that no class gift should be
invalidated by the failure of the gift to some members of the class
and that persons shall be excluded from the class if they come into
the class at any time beyond the "wait and see" period.
The proposed statute, in effect, would achieve all of these re-
forms through a broad cy pres enactment rather than through the
"bits and pieces" approach outlined above. The first portion of the
statute is copied from that of Massachusetts, which was developed
largely through the efforts of Professor Leach of Harvard. The effect
is, of course, to adopt a modified wait and see approach with all
dispositions' validity determined at the end of life estates or other
appropriate lives, rather than at the creation of the interests or, at
the other extreme, at the expiration of the full term of the Rule. The
third sentence of the proposed statute adopts the "cy pres" or re-
form principle, thus permitting the courts to ascertain the intent of
the donor and to reform the instrument, if indicated, in order to give
effect to that intent. This is a simple and therefore preferable way
to meet specific problems of age contingency and the like. The effect
of the entire statute would be to eliminate many of the harsh results
so often accompanying the application of the common-law rule. The
statute would validate some gifts that are void under the present
Rule by upholding gifts, which as events evolve, do not in fact
violate the Rule. The statute would also reform those gifts partially
or totally violating the Rule by saving them and carrying out the
donor's intent to the extent possible. It is believed that simplicity
is essential in the reform legislation. For this reason, the approach
of a modified "wait and see" coupled with a generalized statement
of reform powers is preferable to the coupling of a modified "wait
and see" approach with specific cy pres authorizations as to age
contingencies, class gifts and the like. Section 2(a) of the proposed
statute is patterned generally on the Kentucky law,89 and under-
takes to control possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condi-
tion broken created after the effective date of the statute by limiting
their effective lives to thirty years from the date of their creation.
Section 2(b) of the statute undertakes to control the same future
89. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.219,-.221 (1973). No effort is made here to suggest the
form or content of the required notice. Presumably any legislation adopted would include
such details.
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estates created before the effective date of the statute.
In view of the difficult experience elsewhere with change of the
common-law rule, the proposed statute would avoid the most objec-
tionable difficulties of reform while achieving more simply the un-
derlying goal of the common-law Rule against Perpetuities: a bal-
ance between free alienation of private property and the right of a
donor to control future dispositions of his property.
